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This paper compares the P-bar model of price adjustment with the currently dominant Calvo specification.
Theoretically, the P-bar model is more attractive as it depends upon adjustment costs for physical
quantities rather than nominal prices, while incorporating a one-period information lag.  Furthermore,
the resulting adjustment relation is more completely free of "money illusion," in terms of dynamic
relationships, and therefore satisfies the natural rate hypothesis of Lucas (1972), which is not satisfied
by the Calvo model in any of its variants.  Along the way, it shows that both the P-bar and Calvo models
can be formulated in distinct versions in which current real wages are, or are not, allocative.  Quantitatively,
for a given calibration of the demand parameters, the implied time series properties of the inflation
rate, output gap, and nominal interest rate are determined for various policy parameters, and are compared
with quarterly data for the U.S. economy.  Neither model dominates but, overall, the comparison seems
somewhat more favorable to the P-bar model and certainly does not provide support for the dominant
position held by the Calvo model in current monetary policy analysis.
Bennett T. McCallum






  It is generally agreed that the “Phillips Curve” relationship—i.e., the component 
of a macroeconomic model that describes the way in which price adjustments are made—
is crucial for understanding the link between monetary policy actions and the behavior of 
real macroeconomic aggregates such as output and employment.  Indeed, this is in effect 
agreed to even by real-business-cycle (RBC) proponents, when they specify that price 
adjustments are virtually complete within each period, for they are thereby implicitly 
adopting a limiting case of the Phillips curve—one that implies that the effects of 
monetary policy on the cyclical behavior of these real aggregates are almost non-existent.  
  In addition, it is currently the case that a discrete-time version of the Calvo (1983) 
model of staggered price-setting is by far the leading—indeed, dominant—specification 
of the Phillips curve relationship.
1  There are reasons, however, to be somewhat 
dissatisfied with this state of affairs.  First, it has been persuasively argued by critics 
including Mankiw (2001), Mankiw and Reis (2002), Estrella and Fuhrer (2002), and 
Rudd and Whelan (2007) that the basic form of the Calvo model is drastically 
inconsistent with crucial properties of the basic time-series data on inflation, output, and 
employment.  Arguably effective counter-arguments have been developed by Woodford 
(2003), Sbordone (2006), Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2005), and others, but it 
remains troublesome that sophisticated analysis is required to avoid serious discrepancy 
with the most basic facts.  In addition, there are a priori reasons for objection to the Calvo 
specification, including the highly stylized timing structure, the emphasis on costs of 
price adjustments per se, the absence of any implied autoregressive components, and the 
                                                 
1 This claim probably needs little justification, but is supported by the extensive use of the Calvo model in 
Woodford’s (2003) seminal treatise and in Walsh’s (2005) excellent graduate-level textbook.     2
model’s failure to satisfy the natural-rate hypothesis.  There is ample reason, accordingly, 
to give consideration to alternative models of price adjustment.   
  In what follows, such consideration is given to one particular alternative, namely, 
the “P-bar” model utilized by McCallum and Nelson (1999a, 1999b), which is based on 
previous work by McCallum (1980, 1994), Mussa (1981), and Barro and Grossman 
(1976).  This specification lacks certain features favored by proponents of the Calvo 
model,
2 but has three significant advantages.  First, the P-bar model satisfies the strict 
version of the natural rate hypothesis, whereas the Calvo model does not satisfy even the 
weaker “accelerationist” version.
3  Second, the P-bar model relies on costs of adjusting 
output or employment, which are more tangible and better documented than menu costs 
of changing prices.  Third, the unadulterated version of the P-bar model implies the 
existence of autoregressive components in the implied time-series processes for output 
and inflation.  Consequently, in several respects it produces more realistic autocorrelation 
patterns for crucial variables (including output and inflation) than does the basic Calvo 
specification in a standard three-equation macro model consisting of the price adjustment 
equation, an optimizing IS-type demand relationship, and a Taylor-style monetary policy 
rule for the nominal interest rate. 
  One non-standard feature of the investigation of dynamics conducted below is its 
attention to the possibility that U.S. monetary policy practice has changed significantly 
over the last 25 years, with the Volcker disinflation of 1979-1984 leading to a subsequent 
improvement that can be approximated as the elimination of a random-walk component 
in the Fed’s implicit inflation target.  This type of change could be responsible for the 
                                                 
2 The main such feature is the hypothesized distribution of different prices by sellers of differentiated 
goods, which gives rise to resource misallocation resulting from inflation. 
3 See McCallum and Nelson (1999a) or Mankiw and Reis (2002), as well as Section 6 below.   3
significant reduction in inflation persistence that is found in the post-1987 data, which the 
P-bar model matches somewhat better than data pertaining to the previous era—for 
example, 1954-1986. 
  The paper’s organization is as follows.  In Section 2 the basic features of the P-bar 
model are presented in an informal manner.  Sections 3 and 4 then develop a more formal 
analysis of a flexible-price economy and a general approach to the introduction of sticky 
prices with demand-determined output into the foregoing framework.  For comparative 
purposes, the more familiar Calvo model is discussed in a parallel manner in Section 5 
after which Section 6 contrasts the status of the Calvo and P-bar models with respect to 
the fundamental natural-rate hypothesis of Lucas (1972).  Section 7 develops a 
calibration to be used in the dynamic investigation of these two models that is conducted 
in Section 8, and Section 9 provides a short conclusion. 
2. Basic Features of the P-Bar Model 
  The simplest and most basic way of introducing price stickiness into a macro 
model is to specify that prices for each period t are set at the start of that period, on the 
basis of information available from previous periods, at their expected market-clearing or 
“natural-rate” levels.
4  Then quantities demanded at those prices are supplied by sellers 
even when shocks result in conditions different from those expected.  Letting pt denote 
the log of a typical seller’s price Pt, this specification would be that  tt 1 t pE p − = , where 
t1 t t t1 Ep E ( p ) −− ≡Ω with  t p  denoting the market-clearing price and Ωt including 
observations on all variables in periods t, t−1, t−2, ....  Thus the basic adjustment friction 
is simply that current-period observations are not available to agents when setting prices 
                                                 
4 These levels may reflect the influence of market power, as mentioned by Friedman (1968).   4
for that period.  The dynamics resulting from the foregoing specification are excessively 
limited, however, so some additional structure is needed to have any hope of matching 
actual price-output data.  In that regard, the Rotemberg (1982) model posits quadratic 
costs of changing nominal prices from one period to the next, and leads to a reduced-form 
expression that is almost exactly the same as that pertaining to the aggregate price level 
in the Calvo model.  It would seem, however, that the costs of adjusting employment (or 
output) between periods are more tangible and more significant that those of changing 
prices.  Accordingly, the P-bar model assumes instead that there are (quadratic) costs of 
changing output.  More precisely, there is a quadratic cost of changing the output gap, 
tt t yyy =−  , where yt is the log of output and  t y  is the log of the natural rate of output, 
i.e., the flexible-price rate of output.
5  Let us now consider the implications for price 
adjustment. 
  We have in mind, as is standard, use of the Dixit-Stiglitz consumption index, 
based on the assumption that the typical household has CES preferences for individual 
goods with a common elasticity of substitution of θ (it is assumed that θ > 1).  This setup 
gives rise to aggregate demands for each good with price elasticities of θ.  Therefore, for 
each seller one can define the (log) price  t p such that  tt tt pp( 1 / ) ( yy ) . − =θ −  
Thus,  t p  is the price that would make the demand for the seller’s product equal to its 
“natural-rate” quantity.  In a symmetric equilibrium, then,  t p becomes the price that 
would prevail if prices adjusted promptly to current conditions, in other words, the 
flexible-price price level (associated with the flexible-price level of output,
t y ).   
                                                 
5 It is the change in the gap that is relevant because it is costly to change employment levels while changes 
in labor productivity, brought about by technology shocks, do not require changes in the work force.   5
  In a given period t, a seller will incur adjustment costs if  tt yy − differs from 
t1 t1 yy −− − and will also incur basic allocational costs whenever  tt yy −  differs from 
zero.  Treating these costs as quadratic, it follows that the optimal choice of  tt yy −   is a 
weighted average of zero and  t t t1 t1 (y y) (y y ). −− − −−
6  Thus we assume that sellers set 
prices so as to make the expected value of  ttt yyy ≡ −   equal to a weighted average of 
zero and  tt 1 yy − −  , and then produce quantities that will satisfy the demand that is 
forthcoming in t at that price.  In short, sellers set prices so as to make t1 t t1 Ey y −− =φ  , 
where φ is a positive fraction whose value depends upon the relative costs of (i) 
adjusting output and (ii) having output differ from its natural-rate value.     
  This behavior can equivalently be specified in terms of pt and 
t p by inserting 
tt 1 t pE p − −  in place of  t1 t Ey −  in the foregoing equation and  t1 t1 pp − − −  in place of  t1 y −  , 
the θs and −1’s cancelling out.
7  Thus we obtain  t t1 t t1 t1 pE p ( p p ) − −− − =φ − and from 
this, rearrangement yields 
(1)  tt 1 t 1t 1 t 1 tt 1 pp ( 1) ( p p ) E ( pp ) −− − − − −= − φ − + − , 
which is the relationship that was termed the “P-bar model” by McCallum (1994).
8  
Intuitively, the two right-hand side terms represent the extent of price “disequilibrium” in 
period t−1 and the change in the “equilibrium” value between t−1 and t.  A more formal 
derivation is provided below, in Appendix A. 
 
                                                 
6 This is true even if the price setting decision is based on dynamic optimizing behavior that takes account 
of implications for all future periods; see McCallum and Nelson (1999a) or Appendix A below.  The value 
of φ is different than it would be if the forward-looking nature of behavior were not taken into account. 
7 Note that pt = Et-1pt, since the former is predetermined. 
8 The model was developed and utilized by Herschel Grossman, Robert Barro, Michael Mussa, and 
McCallum in the 1970s and early 1980s; for references see McCallum (1994, pp. 251-252).   6
3. Flexible-Price Relations 
  The foregoing discussion concerns departures of current prices and quantities 
from their flexible-price (natural-rate) values that would prevail in the absence of any 
price stickiness.  To develop the picture more analytically, it is therefore useful to 
examine the nature of the flexible-price values that serve as points of reference.  We do 
so with a rather simple model of optimizing behavior on the part of households that 
consume Dixit-Stiglitz bundles of consumption goods and specialize in production of a 
single good, in the sale of which they have some market power. Accordingly, consider a 









where σ > 0 is the inverse of its intertemporal elasticity of substitution and γ > 0 is the 
labor supply elasticity.  The household can sell its labor on the market for a real wage of 
wt and can buy or sell bonds (bt+1) at a real interest rate of rt.  Also, the household 
operates a production facility and sells its output 
a1 a
tt t YA k n d
− =  at the nominal price Pt 
according to the demand function 
AA
tt t Y( P / P)
−θ, where 
AA
tt Y  and P  are aggregate 
demand and the aggregate price level, respectively, with ndt = labor used in production.  
Then, with txt = lump-sum tax payments, the household’s budget constraint for t is  
(3) wt(nt − ndt) + 
AA 1








 + bt − txt − ct = 0 




−  − 
AA
tt t Y( P / P)
−θ = 0. 
  From these we write a Lagrangian function that is the discounted present value of   7
(2) over the infinite future, plus the discounted present values of the left-hand sides of (3) 
and (4), multiplied by the Lagrange multipliers λt and ξt, respectively.  Then taking 
derivatives with respect to ct, nt, ndt, bt+1, and Pt we obtain—abstracting from the 
difference between expected values and realizations—the first-order conditions: 
(5)  tt c0
−σ −λ =  
(6)  tt t nw 0
γ −Ψ +λ =  
(7) 
1
tt t t t w( 1 ) A k n d0















t t t t tt tt A1 A
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λ− θ − ξ − θ =⇒ λ = ξ
θ−
 . 
These seven equations (3)-(9) determine the household’s choices for the variables ct, nt, 
ndt, bt+1, Pt, λt, and ξt in response to the exogenous (to the household) variables At, wt, rt, 
txt, 
AA
tt Y , and P . Actually, of course, these are seven difference equations that govern the 
paths of the seven variables, given an initial condition on bt and relevant transversality 
conditions. 
  Now we consider general market equilibrium, resulting when a large number of 
households, similar to the one just described but each producing and selling its own 
differentiated good, interact competitively.  The symmetric monopolistic competition 
equilibrium will have the same values for each household for the various variables and 
will also satisfy 
A
tt PP = and nt = ndt.  In addition, the government determines values for 
its per-capital consumption gt and txt, and is subject to the government budget constraint   8







 − bt. 
Thus we can add an additional equation, the Fisher identity 
(11) Rt = rt + Etπt+1, 
where 
(12)  πt+1 = pt+1 − pt, 
and then specify that the nominal one-period interest rate Rt is controlled by the central 
bank according to a monetary policy rule such as 
(13)  t0 1 t R( ) =µ +µ π  
with µ1 > 1.  Then the system (3)-(13) can be considered as governing the behavior of ct, 
nt, bt+1, Pt, λt, ξt, wt, Yt, rt, Rt, and πt, given exogenous determination of  gt, txt, and At, the 
first two by policy and the latter by technology.
9 
4. Sticky Prices 
  We now wish to modify the system at hand to reflect the phenomenon of price 
level stickiness.  In order to do this, let us use  t Y to represent the values of Yt that are 
determined by the system (3)-(13).  Notice that these values can be regarded as 
determined by a time-invariant function of the system’s exogenous variables At and gt, 
the tax/transfer variable txt being irrelevant because the specified system has the property 
of Ricardian equivalence.
10  With the path for  t Y  and therefore  t y  given, we can return 
to our system (3)-(13) but with (9) replaced by a specification of price adjustment 
                                                 
9 Here we write Yt in place of 
A
t Y . 
10 In the counting exercise above, we can replace (3) with the overall resource constraint in which bt and txt 
do not appear, in which case the only role for (10) is to determine b for given values of tr.   9
behavior that reflects the presumed nominal stickiness.  In the case at hand, that equation 
is (1).  It adds the endogenous variable  t p but we also have the demand relationship  
(14)  tt tt p p( 1 / ) ( yy ) −=θ −  
and in addition the linearized overall resource constraint
11 
(15)  tc tg t ycg =ω +ω  
to complete the sticky-price system.  That is, equations (1), (5), (8), and (11)-(15) 
determine, with P-bar price behavior, the eight endogenous variables ct, pt,  t t p  λt, yt, rt, 
Rt, and πt. 
  But what about the labor market variables, one might ask: are they determined by 
including (3), (4), (6), and (7) to explain nt, ndt, wt, and ξt?  Clearly not, for with nt = ndt 
inclusion of these relations would overdetermine the system.  That is because we have 
specified the model to include (14), which makes output essentially demand determined.  
Thus our assumptions imply that one or more of the relations (3), (4), (6), (7), and nt = ndt 
must be violated. 
  Our preferred specification in that regard is as follows.  With yt determined as 
outlined above, labor employed, ndt, is dictated by the production function in (4).  We 
then suppose that the labor supply and demand relations (6) and (7) are irrelevant for the 
determination of employment within each period, although they play essential roles in 
determining  t y .  That is, we visualize workers and producers agreeing in advance (i) that 
employment in period t will be whatever it needs to be to satisfy the employment (ndt) 
magnitude required by the production function (given yt as specified above) and (ii) that 
bargaining between producers and workers determines, in advance of t, the nominal wage 
                                                 
11 Obviously, ωc and ωg are the steady-state shares of consumption and government in national income.   10
in relation to expected values of employment and the real wage rate wt.  These values will 
be related, in some fashion determined by this bargaining, to the flexible-price values  t w 
and  tt nn d =  that are implied (as functions of At) by (6) and (7).  Thus the nominal wage 
Wt for t is set at the value that equals this expected real wage [say, (1+δw) t w ] times the 
expected price level.  In symbols, ndt = 
a1 / ( 1 a )
tt (Y /A k )
− , nt = ndt, Et-1(log wt) = 
t1 t w E( l o g w ) − +δ , and log Wt = Et-1(log wt + log Pt). 
  In passing, it might be noted that this last method of demand-determination of 
output could be applied to a Calvo-type form of price adjustment.  In that case, we would 
have  tt 1 t t pp[ p p ] + ∆= β ∆ + κ − , with  t p being the price under full price flexibility.  And if 
one followed the usual analysis,  t p − pt would move proportionately with real marginal 
cost.  But one can assume instead that (14) holds, with output being demand determined 
and the labor market functioning as specified in the previous paragraph.  It would seem, 
accordingly, that this latter version of the Calvo equation should perhaps be termed the 
“New Keynesian” model of the Phillips curve, with the usual version then designated as 
the “New Neoclassical Synthesis” model, as in Goodfriend and King (1997). 
5. Comparison with Calvo Model 
  The development of the P-bar model just given treats the labor market quite 
differently from typical discussions in the recent literature.  Accordingly, it may be 
helpful to demonstrate that, as asserted in the previous paragraph, an analogous 
specification can be applied as well to the Calvo model.  Let  t p
∗ denote the (log of the) 
nominal price that would be optimal in period t if prices were fully flexible.  Our present 
objective, then, is to derive the relationship between these  t p
∗ values and the prices pt that   11
are chosen when the Calvo frictions are operative.  We do this first for a typical seller, 
assuming that sellers are alike but behave independently. 
 Let  1−α denote the fraction of sellers permitted to change their prices within any 
period and also the probability that a given seller can change his price in any specific 
period.  Now  t p
∗ is the price that a seller would choose in period t if it could be changed 
again in t +1; but with probability α the seller will not be able to do so.  If he knew that 
he would in this case be able to change his price in t+2, then in t he would choose a 
weighted average of  t p
∗ and  tt 1 Ep
∗







(With probability 1−α,  t1 p
∗
+ is irrelevant in t.)  Here the β terms are discount factors 
pertaining to events in the future.
12  Similarly, if instead the seller could with certainty 
change his price in t+3, he would choose Et 
** 2 2 *







  But, continuing, 
since there is no future period in which he will for certain be able to change his price, in 
period t the seller charges 
(16) Et 
** 2 2 *










 Consequently, since 1 + αβ + α
2β
2  + ··· = (1 − αβ)
-1, the optimal reset price xt is a 
probabilistically discounted present value of expected current and future values of p*t+j: 
(17) xt = (1 − αβ) Et[p*t + αβ p*t+1 + (αβ)
2 p*t+2 + …]. 
 Here  xt is the same for all sellers, but since some do not get to change their price 
                                                 
12 This result (and those below) depends upon the presumption that for pt ≠  t p
∗ , the seller’s loss is quadratic 
in pt −  t p
∗ , which makes “certainty equivalence” results applicable.   A presentation similar to ours is given 
by Walsh (2003, pp. 225-7).  
   12
in t, we need to determine the average price pt (i.e., the price level) in t.  Since the 
fraction of sellers charging xt will be (1 − α), and the fraction charging xt-j will be 
 (1 − α)α
j, we see that 
(18) pt = (1 − α)[xt + αxt-1 + α
2xt-2 + …]. 
  Now, by using (17) to eliminate the xt+j terms in (18) we can find the relationship 
between price levels pt and those  t p
∗ values that would be optimal in the absence of the 
Calvo price adjustment frictions.  This result can be expressed in the familiar form 
(19)  ∆pt = βEt∆pt+1 + κ(p*t − pt), 
where κ > 0.  The object now is to demonstrate that together (17) and (18) imply (19). 
  First we write (17) and (18), using the lag operator L, defined by zt-j = L
j zt, as
13  




-2 + …] t p






 (18’)  pt = (1−α)[1 + αL + α
2L




Substituting (17’) into (18’) we obtain 
(20) 
1
tt (1 L)(1 L )p (1 )(1 )p
−∗ −α −αβ = −α −αβ . 
Now multiply the terms in parentheses on the left-hand side and subtract t (1 )(1 )p −α −αβ  
from each side.  Then four terms can be cancelled out on the left-hand side, yielding 
(21) 
1
tt t (LL ) p ( 1 ) ( 1) [ p p ]
−∗ α−α −αβ +αβ = −α −αβ − . 
Next factor out α on the left-hand side and obtain 
(22) 
1
tt t [(1 L) (L 1)]p (1 )(1 )[p p ]
−∗ α − −β − = −α −αβ − . 
Finally, the latter can be expressed as 
                                                 
13 Here I am ignoring the expectation operator; this matter will be discussed below.   13
(23)  tt 1 1 t t pp[ p p ]
∗
+ ∆= β ∆ + κ −    ,                                             1
(1 )(1 ) −α −αβ
κ=
α
.   
This is much like the familiar Calvo formula, except for the absence of the Et operator on 
∆pt+1.  But we could just as well have applied Et to both (17) and (18) before beginning, 
which would eliminate that difference and give the desired relationship between pt and 
t p
∗ values. 
  But how does the term  tt [p p ]
∗ −  relate to the term that usually appears in 
presentations of the Calvo model, the price markup times marginal cost?  To determine 
this, let us refer to the flexible-price model presented in (3)-(13) above.  There the price 
being chosen is labeled Pt and the seller relates it optimally, under price flexibility, to the 
economy-wide average price, denoted 
A
t P , according to equation (9), which we write as 
A
tt tt  P/ P ( / ) [/ ( 1 ) ] =ξ λ θθ − .  But equation (7) shows unambiguously that the ratio 
tt  (/) ξλequals real marginal cost for the producer, so (9) is the exact counterpart of 
tt [p p ]
∗ −  =  tt log ( / ) log[ /( 1)] ξλ+ θθ − , log of the markup times real marginal cost.  Thus 
the approach developed in this section yields the same price equation, when the Calvo-
type friction is present, as the version utilized by Woodford (2003), Gali and Gertler 
(1999), Sbordone (2002), Walsh (2003), and many others. 
  Note, however, that the specification of  t p
∗ − pt in (23) should depend upon the 
labor market structure in the economy being modeled.  If workers are hired on a spot 
market, it is appropriate to specify that   t p
∗ − pt is given by the departure of marginal cost 
from its steady-state (and flexible price) value, as we have just done.  But if workers are 
employed via contracting arrangements of the type specified above in Section 4 for the    14
P-bar model, then the relation  tt [p p ]
∗ − =  tt tt pp( 1 / ) ( yy ) − =θ − is again appropriate, 
and the value of the coefficient attached to  tt [p p ]
∗ −  in the price adjustment equation 
tt 1 1 t t pp ( 1 / ) [ y y ] + ∆= β ∆ + κ θ −  is determined mainly by demand, not supply, conditions.   
  It is interesting to note that the formulation developed in this section corresponds 
quite closely in several respects to the original presentation in Calvo (1983), although 
here in discrete time.  Specifically, Calvo’s equations (2) and (3) are continuous-time 
analogs of (17) and (18) above, but with symbols Vt, Pt, and Pt + βEt in place of our xt, pt, 
and pt*.
14  The meaning of these symbols will therefore be exactly the same if Calvo’s  
Pt + βEt  is taken to be the same as our pt*, the price in the absence of the nominal 
friction.  His interpretation is that Pt reflects “the average price set by competitors” and Et 
represents “excess demand.”  Since the latter will be zero with full price flexibility, his 
expression reduces to ours when Et = 0 and serves the same function under other 
conditions. 
6. The Natural Rate Hypothesis 
  As suggested above, a fundamental concept in monetary macroeconomics is the 
“natural-rate hypothesis,” introduced by Friedman (1966, 1968) and refined by Lucas (1972).  
Friedman’s version of this hypothesis is that differing steady-state inflation rates will not 
keep output (or employment) permanently high or low relative to the “natural-rate” levels 
that would prevail in the absence of nominal price stickiness in the relevant economies.  
Lucas’s version is stronger; it asserts that there is no monetary policy that can permanently 
keep output (or employment) above its natural-rate value, not even with an ever-increasing 
(or ever-decreasing) inflation rate.  It should be noted that both of these concepts are distinct 
                                                 
14 Calvo’s parameter β is positive but is not the discount rate.   15
from monetary superneutrality: an economy can be one in which superneutrality does not 
obtain, in the sense that different permanent inflation rates lead to different steady-state 
levels of capital and thus natural rates of output, without any implied failure of the natural-
rate hypothesis (NRH), which concerns the difference between actual and natural-rate levels 
of output (and other real variables).    
  The validity of the NRH—or of Friedman’s weaker version, the “accelerationist” 
hypothesis—was a matter of much analysis and debate in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
The earliest empirical tests were not supportive of the NRH, but the arguments of Lucas 
(1972) and Sargent (1971), emphasizing that the utilized test procedures would be 
inappropriate under rational expectations, led to a reversal of typical findings and by 1980 
even self-styled Keynesian economists were agreeing to the proposition that the NRH was 
basically valid.  In recent years, however, this agreement has seemingly been implicitly 
overturned, not by explicit argument but mainly by practice, via the widespread adoption of 
the Calvo (1983) adjustment mechanism.  As stated above, the Calvo model posits that price 
adjustments can be made during any period by only a fraction of all sellers, with all others 
holding their nominal prices fixed at their previous-period values.  Then, with a Cobb-
Douglas production function, the adjustment equation (23) above can be written as follows, 
where yt is the log of output and y t is its natural-rate value (Walsh, 2005, pp. 238-9): 
(24)  πt = βEtπt+1 + κ(yt − y t)                                                      κ ≠ κ1 
Here β is the discount factor satisfying 0 < β < 1 so, in a steady state, we have an implied 
relationship between inflation and the (constant) output gap, i.e., the constant value of  
yt − y t.  Therefore the Calvo model does not satisfy even the accelerationist hypothesis, 
much less the stronger NRH.  It is surprising to me that relationships similar to (24) would be   16
used so frequently in today’s analysis.
15  I would think that analysts would, at a minimum, 
replace (24) with something like the following: 
(24’)  πt − π = β(Etπt+1 − π) + κ(yt − y t). 
Here π represents the steady-state inflation rate under an existing policy rule, assumed to be 
one that permits a steady-state inflation rate.
16  Such a relationship would result if it is 
assumed that those sellers that do not have an opportunity (in a given period) to reset their 
prices optimally, have their prices change automatically at the ongoing inflation rate (rather 
than being held constant).  From a steady-state perspective, (24’) would imply yt − y t = 0, 
thereby satisfying the accelerationist hypothesis, Friedman’s weaker version of the NRH.  
(Even so, specification (24’) does not satisfy the stronger Lucas version, which pertains to 
inflation paths more general than deterministic steady states.)  
  In what way would this change affect current reasoning regarding monetary policy?  
Basically, it would imply that different steady-state inflation rates would not induce different 
steady-state output gaps.  In the influential analysis of Woodford (2003, Ch. 6), the optimal 
steady-state inflation rate is zero, in the absence of traditional shoe-leather costs of inflation 
(due to transaction frictions which give money its medium-of-exchange role).
17  Thus with 
these frictions included, as in Friedman (1969), the optimal rate will lie between zero and the 
negative value implied by Friedman’s analysis.  But with our suggested change to price 
adjustment specification (24’), different inflation rates will not have any permanent effect on 
the (zero) output gap, and the Friedman rate (which reduces the opportunity cost of holding 
money to zero) would seem to be implied from the steady-state perspective. 
                                                 
15 I have used them several times myself, but mainly for illustrative purposes (as below). 
16 Other reference values for inflation yield similar results.  For some discussion, see Woodford (2003, pp. 
213-7 and 347-52) and references given there. 
17 Also see King and Wolman (1999).   17
  To complete this section, let us note that the P-bar model does satisfy even the strict 
version of the NRH, arguing as follows.  In the model, the output gap conforms to the 
relation  t1 t t1 Ey y −− =φ  , as we have seen above.  But φ is a positive fraction, so expectationally 
t y   behaves as a stable autoregressive process, with the gap approaching zero asymptotically.  
Thus the only possible steady-state value for  t y   is zero.  In this sense, accordingly, the model 
satisfies the NRH.   Alternatively, one can see from (1) that on average we have 
tt E[p p ] 0 −= , implying that  tt E[y y ] 0 − = .
18     
  Are there other price adjustment specifications that satisfy the NRH?  Yes, the 
Fischer-Gray-Lucas relation  t t 1 t t1 t 2 t1 t1 yy ( pE p ) ( y y ) − −− −= φ − + φ −  of the decade 1975-1985 
does, as well as the more recent Mankiw-Reis (2002) “sticky information” formulation.
19  
Unfortunately, some of the attractive features of the latter—delayed and hump-shaped 
impulse responses to monetary shocks—do not obtain when policy is modeled realistically as 
being conducted via an interest rate instrument, rather than the AR(1) nominal income 
growth relation used by Mankiw and Reis in place of a policy rule.  [See Keen (2007).] 
7. Calibration of the Basic Models 
  Let us now calibrate a benchmark version of the P-bar model for use in 
quantitative exercises designed to explore its dynamic properties, both alone and in 
relation to an analogous model that replaces the P-bar price-adjustment equation with the 
Calvo equation.  The relevant equations, sufficient for determination of the key variables 
πt,  t y   , and Rt, are as follows: 
                                                 
18 Given its justifiably great influence, it is ironic that Lucas’s model in (1972b) features a Phillips Curve 
specification, yt = φ3(pt − Etpt+1), that does not obey the NRH. 
19 Of course, the real-business-cycle version of the Phillips curve, tt yy = , satisfies the NRH trivially.   18
(25)  t t t1 t t t1 t yE y b ( RE ) v ++ =+ − π +   
(26)  t1 t t t1 Ey y −− =φ   
(27) 
2




=− µ + µ π + + µ +   
Here (25) is the expectational IS equation that arises from the combination of (5), (8), and 
(15) above, in the manner familiar in the literature (e.g., McCallum and Nelson, 1999a). 
For its slope parameter we set σ = 1.0 and ωc = 1.00, obtaining b = −1.0.
20  In the P-bar 
equation (26), we set φ at 0.89, the value estimated by McCallum and Nelson (1999a).  
The remainder of the basic calibration pertains to the disturbance processes.  We take the 
monetary policy shock et to be white noise with a standard deviation SD(e) = 0.002, close 
to the value estimated in McCallum and Nelson (1999a).
21   The shock process in the IS 
function, vt, is more complex as it incorporates both preference shocks v1t—not explicitly 
mentioned in the discussion above—and unexpected changes in the levels of both 
government spending and natural-rate output  t y .  In the exercises below, we specify the 
preference shock to be white noise with SD(v1) = 0.01, as in McCallum and Nelson 
(1999a), and the  t y  process to be AR(1) with AR coefficient equal to 0.95 and innovation 
SD of 0.007—close to values reported in the RBC literature.  Also, we take 1/γ to be 
approximately zero, which makes the  t y process result entirely from technology shocks.   
We neglect government spending, thereby treating all output as if it were consumption.   
  For the second model, with Calvo price adjustments, the only change is to replace 
                                                 
20 This value is several times as large as in McCallum and Nelson (1999a), but is only about 1/5 as large as 
the values used by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999) and Woodford (2003).  It represents an 
intermediate position more generally, I believe, in terms of the literature circa 1999-2006 on quantitative 
monetary policy analysis.  
21 In this calibration section, SDs are given in quarterly fractional units, not annualized percentage units as 
in Tables 1 and 2 below.   19
the P-bar equation with the Calvo equation as in (24), with slope coefficient κ = 0.03.  
This value is just slightly higher than typically used by Woodford (2003), and seems 
quite representative of the recent literature.  
  With both models we will consider various parameter values for the monetary 
policy rule (27).  The original Taylor rule, put forth in Taylor (1993), has µ1 = 0.5,  
µ2 = 0.5, and µ3 = 0.0 but results with other values are explored as well.  In particular, the 
inclusion of interest rate smoothing is represented by a setting of µ3 = 0.8.  Furthermore, 
we shall—for reasons mentioned above—consider cases in which a randomly changing 
target inflation rate is included.  It is modeled as a random walk with innovation SD of 
0.001, and appears inside the square brackets in (27).  The inclusion of this last term is 
reported in Tables 1 and 2 below by the indication µ4 = 1.     
  In these exercises the object will be to see how well—or how poorly—the 
calibrated P-bar and Calvo models produce simulated time series that match the most 
basic dynamic facts of the U.S. time series data.  The facts that we have in mind are the 
ones given in the following Table 1, which pertain to the standard deviations and (first) 
autocorrelation coefficients of quarterly observations on the three basic variables 
inflation, output gap, and nominal interest rate.  The measures used for these variables are 
the change in the log of the consumer price index, the Hodrick-Prescott cycle component 
of the log of real GDP, and the federal funds rate.
22  The historical period considered is 
1954.1-2005.4, but we are interested in the two subperiods 1954.1-1987.3 and 1987.4-
2005.4, whose break date corresponds to the date at which Alan Greenspan became 
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  This is a convenient  
                                                 
22 I am highly aware of various weaknesses of the H-P cycle measure of the output gap, but have adopted it 
to keep from departing too much from standard practice.   20
Table 1: U.S Statistics 
Cell entries are standard deviations (per cent p.a.) and AR(1) coeffs for  tt t p,y,  a n d  R ∆   

























Table 2: Properties of Basic Model with P-Bar Price Adjustment 
Cell entries are standard deviations (per cent p.a.) and AR(1) coeffs for  tt t p,y,  a n d  R ∆   
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Calibration: b = −1, φ = 0.89, SD(v) = 0.01, SD(a) = 0.007, SD(e) = 0.002, SD(ζ) = 0.001   21
 
Table 3: Properties of Basic Model with Calvo Price Adjustment 
Cell entries are standard deviations (per cent p.a.) and AR(1) coeffs for  tt t p,y,  a n d  R ∆   
  µ3 = 0, µ4 = 0  µ3 = 0.8, µ4 = 0  µ3 = 0, µ4 = 1  µ3 = 0.8, µ4 = 1 
µ1 = 0.5 
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Calibration: b = −1, κ = 0.03, SD(v) = 0.01, SD(a) = 0.007, SD(e) = 0.002, SD(ζ) = 0.001 
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and fairly standard date to use to separate the recent period of superior monetary policy 
performance from the post-World War II experience more generally.
23  To reflect the 
change, a shock to the inflation target will be introduced into (27) by changing π* to  
π* + µ4ζt, with  ζt a random walk and µ4 = 1 for 1987.4-2005.4 and 0 otherwise.    
8. Dynamic Properties of the Models 
  Dynamic properties of the foregoing models were obtained, approximately, by 
means of stochastic simulations.  In each cell in Tables 2 and 3, the reported magnitudes 
are mean values over 200 replications with each simulation pertaining to a sample of 200 
periods (quarters), with 50 start-up periods discarded in each case.  The magnitudes in 
each cell are, for the case at hand, the standard deviations of inflation, the output gap, and 
the interest rate (respectively) plus the first univariate autocorrelation coefficient for each 
of these same three variables.  The standard deviations, which may be thought of as 
reflecting root-mean-square targeting errors for inflation and the output gap, are 
expressed as annualized percentages.
24     
  Table 2 reports results for several variants of the policy rule.  In the first column 
both µ3 and µ4 are kept equal to zero, so the rule does not feature interest rate smoothing 
or a time-varying inflation target.  In the first row, µ1 equals 0.5 to represent mild policy 
response to inflation deviations, well above the 0.0 value needed to reflect adherence to 
the Taylor principle, while µ2 = 0 represents an absence of response to the output gap.  In 
this case, variability of all three variables—inflation, gap, and interest rate—is 
considerably greater than is found in the U.S. data.  All three of these variables have 
                                                 
23 This dating does not imply any disagreement with the notion that a (perhaps “the”) crucial step in the 
move toward responsible monetary policy took place over 1979-1984 as the Volcker disinflation.  
24 For the output gap the figure is of course not annualized, since it has no time-unit dimension.      23
(first) autocorrelation coefficients of approximately 0.87, representing strong—and 
reasonably realistic—persistence in their time series properties. 
 Increasing  µ2 to 0.5 in the second row reduces the variability of  t y  but leaves the 
SDs high for inflation and interest.  Adoption of µ1 = 2.0 and µ2 = 1.0 in the fourth row 
reduces the variability of inflation to a realistic level.  It leaves SD( t y  ) and SD(Rt)  
higher than is realistic, but not by an excessive margin, and produces serial correlation 
coefficients for inflation (ρπ) and the gap that are quite realistic, and for Rt that is low but 
not terribly so. 
  In the second column, interest rate smoothing is introduced in all cases.  This has 
the effect of reducing the variability of all three reported variables. Persistence remains 
high for  t y   and Rt measures, but falls to rather low values for inflation.  For that reason, 
columns 3 and 4 are included to investigate the possibility that  π ρ would be increased to 
realistic levels by inclusion of the random-walk inflation target (by setting µ4 = 1).   As 
will be seen, these values are increased but not to the strong-persistence magnitudes 
observed in actual data for the years prior to 1987. 
  In Table 3, we have similar exercises for the model but with the Calvo price 
adjustment equation used instead of the P-bar relation.  Here the difficulties are even 
more serious for the calibration at hand.  In the first two columns the SD values for all 
three variables are well below realistic values; for inflation the SD is less than 1.0 in all 
cases (falling as low as 0.18).  Furthermore, the autocorrelation coefficients are very low 
for the output gap in both columns and for the interest rate in column 1.  When we turn to 
columns 3 and 4, with the variable inflation target, inflation rate and interest rate SD   24
values rise to realistic levels, but SD( t y  ) remains rather low.  Most significantly, 
however, the autocorrelation coefficient for the output gap is quite low in all cases, 
reaching a moderate level only in row 1, column 4, where it still remains below 0.5.  
Overall, the impression conveyed by these results is that the basic version of the Calvo 
model performs more poorly than the basic version of the P-bar model.    
9. Conclusion 
  Let us now conclude with an overview of the arguments developed in the 
preceding sections.  Basically, we have compared the P-bar model of price adjustment 
with the currently dominant Calvo specification.  From a theoretical perspective, we have 
argued that the P-bar model is more attractive, since it depends upon adjustment costs for 
physical quantities rather than nominal prices, while incorporating a one-period 
information lag.  Furthermore, the resulting adjustment relation is more completely free 
of “money illusion,” in terms of dynamic relationships, and therefore satisfies the natural 
rate hypothesis of Lucas (1972a), which is arguably a property that any neoclassical 
model should possess—but which is not satisfied by the Calvo model in any of its 
variants.  Along the way, we have shown that both the P-bar and Calvo models can be 
formulated in versions in which current real wages are, or are not, allocative—i.e., in 
which the labor market clears each period or depends upon some form of prior contracts 
according to which sellers choose quantities to satisfy demand at predetermined prices 
with those prices set to maximize revenue to be divided between the seller and his 
contracted workers according to some rule set by bargaining. 
  Quantitatively, we have examined crucial dynamic properties of a calibrated 
model in which the P-bar and Calvo equations are alternatively included.  For a given   25
calibration of the demand parameters, the implied time series properties of the inflation 
rate, output gap, and nominal interest rate are determined for various policy parameters, 
and are compared with quarterly data for the U.S. economy.  Neither model dominates; 
the P-bar model tends to imply more variability than actually observed for both inflation 
and output, whereas the Calvo model implies less variability than actual, especially for 
inflation.  In terms of serial correlation, the P-bar model implies a realistically high 
degree of first-order autocorrelation of the output gap but somewhat less than actual 
autocorrelation of inflation in those cases in which interest-rate smoothing is included in 
the policy rule.  The Calvo specification, on the other hand, does a better job of matching 
inflation persistence (i.e., serial correlation) but a much poorer job with respect to the 
output gap.   
  Overall, our comparison seems somewhat more favorable to the P-bar model and, 
in any case, certainly does not provide support for the dominant position held by the 
Calvo model in current monetary policy analysis.      26
Appendix A 
  Here the purpose is to derive the P-bar equation (1) from the cost-of-adjustment 
model of Section 2.  The seller’s objective is to minimize, at time t, 
(A1) 
j2 2
t1 t j t j 2 t j t j1
j0
E[ ( p p ) c ( y y ) ]
∞
−+ + + + −
=
β−+ − ∑   
where the first term for period t+j represents the cost of having a selling price different 
from the value that would obtain in the absence of price stickiness, with the second term 
representing the cost of changing output.
25  Letting  tt t ppp = −   and using the Dixit-
Stiglitz demand relationship  tt yp =− θ  , (A1) becomes 
(A2) 
j2 2 2
t1 t j 2 t j t j1
j0
E[ p c ( p p ) ]
∞
−+ + + −
=
β+ θ− ∑   . 
The first-order condition for minimization is then 
(A3)  t1 t t t1 t1 t E[ p c ( p p)c ( p p ) ]0 , −− + +−− β−=      
where c = c2θ
2, or, equivalently, 
(A4)  tt 1 t 1 pp p −+ =α +α β   
where  c/( 1 c c ) α= + + β —not the Calvo probability of Section 5—and the expectation 
operator is implicit.  We can see that the relevant solution is of the form  tt 1 pp − =φ  , 
implying that 
2
t1 t1 pp +− =φ  , so substitution into (A4) shows that φ must satisfy  
αβφ








Thus we have, recognizing again the expectation operator, 
                                                 
25 The constant c2 reflects the importance of the second cost relative to the first.   27
(A6)  t t1 t t1 t1 pE p ( p p ) , −− − −= φ −  
as was argued informally in Section 2.  It is shown in McCallum and Nelson (1999a, 
p. 25) that φ is real and satisfies 0 < φ <1.     28
References 
 
Andres, Javier, J. David Lopez-Salido, and Edward Nelson, “Sticky-Price Models and the  
  Natural Rate Hypothesis,” Journal of Monetary Economics 52 (2005), 1025-1053. 
Barro, Robert J., and Herschel I. Grossman, Money, Employment, and Inflation. 
  Cambridge Univerity Press, 1976. 
Calvo, Guillermo A., “Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework,”  
  Journal of Monetary Economics 12 (1983), 383-398. 
Chari, V. V., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Ellen R. McGrattan, “Sticky Price Models of the  
  Business Cycle: Can the Contract Multiplier Solve the Persistence Problem?”  
 Econometrica 68 (2000), 1151-1179.  
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans, “Nominal Rigidities  
  and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy,” Journal of Political 
 Economy 1113 (2005), 1-45. 
Estrella, Arturo, and Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, “Dynamic Inconsistencies: Counterfactual 
  Implications of a Class of Rational-Expectations Models,” American  
 Economic  Review 92 (2002), 1013-1028.  
Friedman, Milton, “Comments,” in Guidelines, Informal Controls, and the Market Place, 
  eds. G.P. Schulz and R.Z. Aliber. University of Chicago Press, 1966. 
___________ , “The role of monetary policy,” American Economic Review 58 (March    
 1968),  1-17. 
_____________, “The Optimum Quantity of Money,” in The Optimum Quantity of Money   
  and Other Essays. Aldine Press, 1969.   29
Gali, Jordi, and Mark Gertler, “Inflation Dynamics: A Structural Econometric Analysis,” 
  Journal of Monetary Economics 44 (1999), 195-222. 
Gali, Jordi, Mark Gertler, and J. David Lopez-Salido, “Robustness of the Estimates of the 
  Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve,” Journal of Monetary Economics 52 
 (2005),  1107-1118. 
Gertler, Mark, “Comment,” in J.B. Taylor, ed., Monetary Policy Rules. University of 
  Chicago Press, 1999 
Goodfriend, Marvin, and Robert G. King, “The New Neoclassical Synthesis and the Role  
  of Monetary Policy,” in B.S. Bernanke and J.J., eds., NBER Macroeconomics 
 Annual  1997. MIT Press, 1997. 
Grossman, Herschel I., “The Cyclical Pattern of Unemployment and Wage Inflation,”  
 Economica  41 (1974), 403-413. 
Keen, Benjamin D., “Sticky Price and Sticky Information Price-Setting Models: What is 
  the Difference?” Economic Inquiry 45 (2007), 770-786. 
King, Robert G., and Alexander L. Wolman, “What Should the Monetary Authority Do 
  When Prices are Sticky?” in J.B. Taylor, ed., Monetary Policy Rules. University 
  of Chicago Press, 1999 
Koenig, Evan F., “Aggregate Price Adjustment: the Fischerian Alternative,” Working 
  Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 1996. 
Lucas, Robert E., Jr.,”Econometric Testing of the Natural Rate Hypothesis,” in O. 
  Eckstein, ed., The Econometrics of Price Determination. Board of Governors of 
  the Federal Reserve System, 1972. (a) 
   30
______________, “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money,” Journal of Economic  
 Theory 4 (1972), 103-124. (b)  
Mankiw, N. Gregory, “The Inexorable and Mysterious Tradeoff between Inflation and 
  Unemployment,” Economic Journal 111 (2001), C45-C61.   
Mankiw, N. Gregory, and Ricardo Reis, “Sticky Information versus Sticky Prices: A  
  Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,” Quarterly Journal of 
 Economics 117 (2002), 1295-1328. 
McCallum, Bennett T., “Rational Expectations and Macroeconomic Stabilization Policy:  
  An Overview, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 12 (1980), 716-746. 
_________, A Semi-Classical Model of Price-Level Adjustment,” Carnegie-Rochester 
  Conference Series on Public Policy 41 (1994), 251-284. 
McCallum, Bennett T., and Edward Nelson, “Performance of Operational Policy Rules in  
  an Estimated Semiclassical Structural Model,” in J.B. Taylor, ed., Monetary 
 Policy    Rules. University of Chicago Press, 1999(a). 
_________________ (1999b) “Nominal Income Targeting in an Open-Economy 
  Optimizing Model,” Journal of Monetary Economics 43 (1999), 553-578. 
Mussa, Michael, “Sticky Prices and Disequilibrium Adjustment in a Rational Model of  
  the Inflationary Process, American Economic Review 71 (1981), 1020-1027.  
Nelson, Edward, “Sluggish Inflation and Optimizing Models of the Business Cycle,” 
  Journal of Monetary Economics 42 (1998), 303-322. 
Rotemberg, Julio J., “Sticky Prices in the United States, Journal of Political Economy 90  
 (1982),  1187-1211. 
   31
Rotemberg, Julio J., and Michael Woodford, “An Optimization-Based Econometric  
  Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy,” in B.S. Bernanke and J.J. 
 Rotemberg,  eds.,  NBER  Macroeconomics Annual 1997. MIT Press, 1997. 
______________________, “Interest Rate Rules in an Estimated Sticky Price Model,” 
  in J.B. Taylor, ed., Monetary  Policy  Rules. University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
Rudd, Jeremy, and Karl Whelan, “Modeling Inflation Dynamics: A Critical Review of 
  Recent Research,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 39 (2007), 155-170. 
Sargent, Thomas J., “A Note on the Accelerationist Controversy,” Journal of Money,   
            Credit, and Banking 3 (1971), 50-60. 
Sbordone, Argia M., “Prices and Unit Labor Costs: A New Test of Price Stickiness,” 
  Journal of Monetary Economics 49 (2002), 265-292. 
________________, “Inflation Persistence: Alternative Interpretations and Policy 
  Implications,” Journal of Monetary Economics 54 (2007), 1311-1339. 
Taylor, John B., “Staggered Price and Wage Setting in Macroeconomics,” in J.B. Taylor  
  and M. Woodford, eds., Handbook of Macroeconomics. Elsevier, 1999. 
Walsh, Carl E., Monetary Theory and Policy, 2nd ed. MIT Press, 2003. 
Woodford, Michael, Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy.  
  Princeton University Press, 2003. 